

# *policy studies*

#18

## ***Technical assistance: Two views***

*Technical assistance (TA) programs allow international donors to play a crucial role in effecting reforms. Research has shown that there are different approaches to technical assistance for EU-candidate countries and former Soviet Union countries, particularly with respect to the principles and methods of TA implementation. Poland's technical assistance programs are governed by its unified strategic framework of helping the country accede to the European Union. Thus, technical assistance there is channeled at developing institutions and promoting investment by fostering infrastructure development. Meanwhile, technical assistance to Ukraine has not been brought into alignment with the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, and the role of TA projects has been reduced to providing recommendations on reform policy.*

*november 2002*

*international centre for policy studies*

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# Acknowledgements

This publication was produced under the framework of the LGI/OSI supported project “Information Collection and Assessment of International Donor Activities in Ukraine and Poland”, which was implemented by the International Centre for Policy Studies (Ukraine) and Institute of Public Affairs (Poland). ICPS was assessing Technical Assistance given to Ukraine; IPA was assessing TA given to Poland. Special thanks to David Larter, Principal Consultant, LDA Larter de Barros Associates for his advice in the process of final report drafting.

Special thanks to representatives of the Ministry of Economy and European Integration of Ukraine and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine for consultations and information about their assessment of donor community work in Ukraine, as well as cooperation between the government of Ukraine and the donor community on TA projects implemented in Ukraine.

Thanks to all donor institutions presented in Ukraine for the information about their country strategies, and the projects that were supported by their institutions.

Thanks to all colleagues from Ukrainian NGOs for information about the TA projects implemented by their organisations.

# Executive summary

## *Background*

Local government reform is intrinsic to the democratic transformation at work in Ukraine and Poland; when local governments function well, the entire state benefits. Committed to democratic reforms, both countries have worked together with the EU in order to create documents leading to EU alignment. In Poland, the Accession Partnership defines the requirements for EU accession; in Ukraine, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) outlines the framework for a political relationship.

The international donor community, through its programs of technical assistance (TA), has played a critical role in the realisation of local government reform. Yet, their activities in Ukraine and Poland are executed very differently. Through comparing these two distinct systems of TA implementation, it becomes clear that the Polish framework, designed in order to attain EU member status, has produced good and sustainable results. On the other hand, the ad hoc, non-systemic assistance in Ukraine has resulted in a considerably slower transformation in every way, including in the local government sector. Further, assessment of the effectiveness of program and project design by the four criteria delineated in the World Bank's Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF: (1) long-term, holistic vision; (2) country ownership; (3) partnership; (4) achieving concrete development results that are linked to the country's vision) discloses similar results. The criteria are implemented to good success in Poland, and are neglected at peril in Ukraine.

## *Methodology*

The methodology for this research was comparative, on the premise that juxtaposition of the two systems would highlight areas of similarity and difference, leading to produc-

tive policy recommendations for local government transformation. To that end, a database was created of donor project activities in the sphere of local government reform in Poland and Ukraine. International and bilateral donors were consulted about their activities in these countries since the demise of the USSR. As well, donor country strategies were assessed against the CDF criteria and against whether or not national strategies and individual projects were created under the framework of the PCA or the APA.

## *Analysis*

Based on the information compiled in the database, our analysis revealed the need for a systemic, targeted national paradigm for technical assistance in Ukraine. Purposeful development of democratic institutions does not occur with ad hoc programming. Poland's successful local government transformation, begun with the passing of the Local Government Act in March 1990 and local elections in May 1990, has been consistently supported with long-term, strategic projects realised in the framework of the APA and fulfilling the identified needs for EU accession. In contrast, Ukraine's first projects began in 1996 and have lacked the geographic coverage, number, and coordinated focus of their Polish counterparts; and without exception they neglect to use the PCA as a framework to coordinate results that would target EU alignment.

## *Conclusions*

The result of the two approaches is seen in the health of local government reform in the two countries. Poland's system, while not perfect, is functioning and steadily achieves the APA criteria that bring the country closer to EU membership. Ukraine's local government environment reflects the partial reforms that have been, in some spheres, successfully implemented in cities and vil-

lages. Elsewhere they have failed, due to neglect of the need for developing democratic interaction between central government representatives, who still possess executive decision-making authority, and newly elected local government bodies. This oversight did not occur in Poland, because TA there supports and fulfils the requirements of the APA and therefore has effected a comprehensive and collaborative transformation of the government at all levels. Our research concluded that until Ukraine's TA programming works in consonance with achieving EU alignment, as outlined in the PCA, the non-systemic, non-targeted situation will continue to undercut the effectiveness of democratic reforms.

### *Recommendations*

In view of the above, we divided our policy recommendations into those relevant to the

Government of Ukraine and those for the donors. We advised the Government to develop the PCA as a technical system and strategic framework for democratic reform. Further, we identified the need to design and coordinate all local government projects under the framework of the PCA and the European Charter on Local Self-Government (ratified by Ukraine in 1996). All subsequent recommendations stem from those two primary needs. Regarding donors, we recommended that programs and projects must target and facilitate the implementation of the PCA, and that project design must include the effectiveness criteria of the World Bank's CDF. As well, productive activities discovered in Poland's projects—development of manuals, skills-based training, and twinning—should also be included in Ukraine's projects. Further recommendations are predicated upon these factors and reflect the working system disclosed in Poland's paradigm.

# Background

Ukraine became independent in 1991, and the prospect of its future success seemed obvious; a famous forecast by Deutsche Bank predicted rapid economic growth. Today, however, another respected institution—Freedom House—has evaluated the reforms in Ukraine and other countries of the former Soviet Union as being in a downward spiral. These nations are underachieving in every significant indicator and, as a result, Freedom House forecasts the creation of a “Schengen Curtain” that will make concrete this growing division between the European Union candidate and non-candidate countries. The causes identified in the report to account for this negative progress are typically historical, cultural, and related to the lack of political will. The recommendations made to rectify the situation fit the assessment and locate reform growth in such transformations as crises, charismatic leaders, and civil disobedience.<sup>1</sup>

In contrast with this bleak scenario, which locates the lack of reform entirely on the side of Ukraine, our experience in policy work leads us to suggest that donors are also a significant variable in the reform process and ought to be included in any assessment of its effectiveness. To test this assumption, we have undertaken a comparative analysis of the strategic nature of technical assistance in two different systems, based on the examples of Poland and Ukraine. The main objective of this research is to provide an analysis of these systems in the framework of local government initiatives, as they seek to support democracy and market economy. This work explores both the areas of consistency and of differences, in the hopes that such juxtaposition will illuminate better and more productive paradigms of technical assistance that are structured to achieve the priorities delineated by the respective country of origin.

## Establishing the benchmarks: Current perspectives on technical assistance

International donors have spent considerable intellectual and financial resources on defining the criteria that pinpoint effective technical assistance. And for good reason: developed nations spend globally about fifteen billion dollars a year on technical assistance, and it is in everyone’s best interest that this sum of money is spent efficiently and effectively.<sup>2</sup> Most recently, the World Bank Organisation has published, and successfully implemented in twelve pilot projects and elsewhere, the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF). This framework has met with extensive success;

countries are utilising the CDF as a basis for their own development strategies. Canada’s *Strengthening Aid Effectiveness: New Approaches to Canada’s International Assistance Program* is but one example of this type of dialogue with the World Bank’s report.

To work effectively, the CDF requires that recipient countries generate a comprehensive country strategy, into which framework all donor projects and activities will fit. This ensures that technical assistance will address the greatest needs, reduce duplication, and increase communication and col-

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<sup>1</sup> Freedom House, *Nations in Transit* 2001, p. 42 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Herfkens, Eveline, “Can we do the right things? The future of technical assistance and capacity building”, *Development Outreach*, Fall 2001, World Bank Institute, p. 30.

laboration between all stakeholders. To produce such a document challenges the developing country to think strategically about:

- the sequencing of policies, programs, and projects;
- the pacing of reforms;
- the balance between sectors;
- alignment of stakeholders;
- more efficient use of available TA resources.

In this context, the CDF embodies four principles:

1. **A long-term, holistic vision** that addresses a country's development priorities in an appropriate, consistent manner that is balanced and non-discrete (linked);
2. **Country ownership, with the country owning and directing the development agenda** through building consensus between the government, civil society, and private sectors, with all stakeholders having their say in setting the agenda;
3. **Establishing a strong partnership among the government, civil society, private sector, donors, international agencies, and other actors** that creates

a single framework aligning actions to the national strategy and supports the country's lead in managing aid coordination;

4. **Achieving concrete development results that are linked to the overall aims of the country's stated vision**, with a key aim being poverty reduction, and others, guided by the International Development Goals generated by UN agreements during the 1990s.

For a framework like the CDF to work, the concept of partnership between donors and developing countries must be fleshed out in concrete, observable documents and actions. Simple assertion is not enough; convincing evidence of partnership-in-action needs to be actualised. The CDF brings the actors together on the preliminary task of asking the developing country what it perceives its own needs to be. Partnership is dialogic, collaborative, and enabling; putting the recipient first is a strong step towards establishing the parameters in which partnership will emerge. This, in turn, leads to the need for clear and non-ambiguous links between the country's stated strategy and the activities pursued, supported, and implemented by the international donor community. When the donor community shapes its technical assistance in consonance with the country strategy, then there is good reason to expect that positive, concrete results will ensue.

### *Freedom House Identifies a Growing Divide*

*The survey trends confirm a growing divide that threatens a new demarcation line in Europe and Eurasia. That new line is emerging between the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the republics that were an integral part of the Soviet Union from its inception. Other basic indicators suggest that the differences between the CEE countries and the 12 non-Baltic republics of the former USSR are striking. Ten of the 15 CEE countries are consolidated democracies. All of the remaining states in the region except Macedonia, which has progressed modestly, have seen significant improvements of more than .25 in their average democratisation scores over a five-year period. Just as important, no CEE country is a consolidated autocracy. Meanwhile, none of the 12 non-Baltic former Soviet republics is a consolidated democracy, and only Georgia and Tajikistan have registered significant progress since the survey was launched in 1997. Five of the 12 states—Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan—have regressed significantly over the last five years in their democratisation ratings and indicators. The remaining five—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—have registered something akin to stasis.*

*Source: Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2001, p. 15*

The question is, therefore, how do the past ten years of technical assistance programming in Ukraine and Poland rate against the criteria outlined in the CDF? The research

leading to this report proposed to provide an answer to this question, framed in the sector of local government reforms.

## Defining the environment of technical assistance in Ukraine, 1991–2001

For ten years, technical assistance in Ukraine has gone forward on an essentially ad-hoc, spontaneous basis. The lack of a comprehensive and unified strategy has created a technical assistance environment that is predominantly:

- uncoordinated;
- unstructured;
- untargeted;
- not monitored; and
- non-collaborative.

Yet, in spite of these gaps, international donors have provided significant financial support for reforms in Ukraine through technical assistance, as a survey of the last few years reveals (Table 1).

Aid has been allocated with the intention of promoting the development and sustainability of democracy and market economy. Yet, more often than not, aid implementation reflects the priorities of the donors and their available resources; this does not necessarily align with what is required to meet the stated objectives in Ukraine. Further exacerbating the problem is the fact that receiving Western aid is a new phenome-

*Table 1. Volumes of international TA to Ukraine from major donors in 1999–2001, millions USD*

Country/Organisation	1999	2000	2001 (forecast)
USA	195.0	195.0	210.0
EU (Takis)	93.6	88.7	88.9
EBRD	55.45	60.0	90.0
Britain	15.1	15.1	15.1
Canada	13.8	13.8	13.8
Germany	9.62	9.62	9.6
Netherlands	8.05	8.05	11.0
IBRD	6.6	7.3	6.6
UNDP	3.5	3.5	3.5
Sweden	2.88	4.25	3.4
Switzerland	1.9	1.9	2.7
Japan	1.5	6.4	6.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>407.0</b>	<b>413.62</b>	<b>461.0</b>

*Source: ICPS, “Research Report for the Administration of the President of Ukraine,” May 2001, p. 4.*



non for Ukraine; the necessary government and civil structures are not in place that could ensure aid fits the desired end. Therefore, aid does not arrive to a prepared, dialogic environment, and the overall effects suffer.

Even today, the government of Ukraine has not created an overarching national strategy or program to structure technical assistance; in fact, the government has not received any international support to enable the production of such a document. As well, Ukraine still does not have a normative-legal basis for international TA programs, or for substantial monitoring of TA activities and results.<sup>3</sup> These factors combine to create a situation that makes it virtually impossible for TA in Ukraine to achieve the results that both the people of Ukraine and the international community want.

In addition to the above problems, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Ukraine, the document that must be systematically implemented as a prior condition for further development of Ukraine's European potential, does not have a voice in the development of technical assistance in Ukraine. Yet, the reform aims of the PCA, according to Article 1, are:

- To provide a framework for a political dialogue (Title II);
- To promote trade, investment, economic relations, and development (titles III to VI);
- To provide a basis for economic, social, financial, civil, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation (titles VII to IX);
- To support the consolidation of democracy and development of the economy, and complete its transition to a market economy.

The actualisation of these aims is not realised in any document, aid design criteria or

effectiveness program. Further, there is no explicit national or donor policy program enabling the achievement of this framework. As a result, Ukraine's progress towards realising the conditions of the PCA is not systematic or targeted and therefore haphazard and ineffective. The PCA functions more as a diplomatic document than a technical strategy enabling Ukraine's transformation process.

In May 1999 a new mechanism, The Common Strategy, was created (adopted in December). The aim of this document was to:

- Support the democratic and economic transition process in Ukraine;
- Provide a means to discuss challenges common to Europe (security, environmental protection, energy, and nuclear safety);
- Provide a means for cooperation concerning EU enlargement, through supporting Ukraine's alignment with European standards in economy, justice, and internal affairs.

To achieve the aims of either the PCA or the Common Strategy requires collaboration between Ukraine and the EU on agreed-upon policies and actions, in order to facilitate Ukraine's participation in major global institutions such as the WTO. In spite of the creation of new documents and agreements, the causal problem of non-strategic implementation continues unabated and unaddressed.

Moreover, without a national strategy or a specifically stated intention in the PCA or the Common Strategy that would govern the design and implementation of technical assistance in Ukraine, it is difficult to provide benchmarks against which project implementation, outputs, and outcomes can be measured. This lack of criteria effectively disables technical assistance from achieving sustainable results. Further, because there is no monitoring procedure tracking respon-

<sup>3</sup> At present, a new regulation is being drafted by the Ministry of Economy and European Integration.

sibility for the results of assistance, Ukraine has an implementation environment that most closely resembles a charity-based paradigm. All of these deficiencies lead to a feeling that technical assistance fails in Ukraine, and this failure tends to be identified as Ukraine's lack of political will to reform.

Rather, the lack of technical assistance planning and policy development is the more likely cause of these unsatisfactory results. Consistent application of the principles of the World Bank's CDF criteria would do much to turn this situation around.

## Defining the environment of technical assistance in Poland, 1991–2001

In stark contrast with Ukraine's technical assistance environment is the situation in Poland. Because Poland is an EU candidate country, it has access to a host of possibilities that do not exist in Ukraine. The first and most important difference lies in Poland's arrangement with the EU, the Accession Partnership. The introduction to the 1999 update of this document states: "The European Council decided that the Accession Partnership would be the key feature of the enhanced pre-accession strategy, mobilising all forms of assistance to the candidate countries within a single framework. In this manner, the EU targets its assistance towards the specific needs of each candidate so as to provide support for overcoming particular problems in view of accession."<sup>4</sup> This document, therefore, plays a critical role in both defining areas of need and designing solutions to meet those needs.

A central commitment for Poland is the implementation of the *acquis communautaire* in order to achieve EU status. The adaptation of Polish law to the EU's legislation ensures that democratic principles are enshrined in Polish legislation. The EU established a three-phase process for this implementation, and placed upon Poland an obligation to draw up a timetable of the necessary legislative work. The achievement of this time-

line is monitored in the Regular Report[s] on Poland's Progress Towards Accession, under the heading "Ability to assume the obligations of membership". This section is structured by analysis of Poland's implementation of each chapter of the *acquis*. Poland is assisted in this process by technical assistance that works within this framework.

Therefore, technical assistance in Poland fits into a pre-defined system and is targeted to achieve the aim of EU membership, administered through instruments such as the EU's PHARE program. Governed by the Copenhagen Criteria, democratic and market economy values are concretely institutionalised through projects that produce tangible outputs, measured against clearly stated benchmarks. As a candidate country, Poland is required to adopt EU institutional standards and develop the necessary infrastructures. For EU membership, Poland's government, civil society, and private sector must implement these technical expectations. To that end, through documents like the national strategy for integration or the numerous position papers written in collaboration with EU experts, Poland moves forward according to a structured, timetabled strategy towards EU accession, with donor funding that supports and enables this work.

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<sup>4</sup> Poland: 1999 Accession Partnership, p. 2.

# Local Government in Ukraine

## Background

What, then, are the main effects of these two different TA environments on the reforms needed in the sector of local government and the decentralisation process? It is first necessary to understand the situation and main problems that local government faces in today's Ukraine.

In terms of the legal background, the authority for local government in Ukraine

derives from Article 7 of the Constitution (adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on 28 June 1996), which states: "Local government is recognised and guaranteed in Ukraine." Section XI of the Constitution is devoted specifically to the organisation of local government; it is one of the most important elements in Ukraine's system of public administration.

## History

The reform of local government began in Ukraine on 7 December 1990, which was proclaimed as the date of local government revival, after a totalitarian regime that had rejected all forms of self-government. The term *local government* was first introduced with the adoption, on this day, of the Law "On local radas [councils] of people's deputies of the UkrSSR and local government" by the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR.

Since gaining independence, Ukraine's local government system has been reformed several times. The key element of these changes, besides those embodied in the Constitution, was the adoption of the Law

"On local self-government in Ukraine" (21 May 1997). According to this law, local government is guaranteed by the state as a right and real capacity for a territorial community. Residents of a village, or a voluntary association of residents of several villages combining into one community, or residents of a settlement or of a city, now have a right to independently resolve issues of a local character within the limits of the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine (Article 2). This Law defines the local government system and guarantees the principles of organisation and activities, legal status, and responsibilities of local government bodies and its officials. It also makes provision for the resources needed to fulfil their functions.

## Structure

In Ukraine, local government authorities exist at the following levels: village (and town), municipal, raion, and oblast. Special laws of Ukraine determine the particular aspects of local government for the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol.<sup>5</sup> Along with local governments, local state executive bodies (raion and oblast state administrations)

also govern at the regional level—that is, all levels where there are local government agencies except municipalities—and in Kyiv and Sevastopol.

The local government system in Ukraine includes the following agencies:

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<sup>5</sup> In January 1999, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a special law on the capital of Ukraine—the city of Kyiv.

- territorial communities;
- village, town, and city radas;
- village, town, and city mayors;
- executive bodies of village, town, and city radas;
- raion and oblast radas, which represent the common interests of the territorial communities of villages, towns, and cities;
- community organisations;
- district councils within a city and their executive committees (optional).

## Towards European standards

Ukraine's formal agreement with the EU, the PCA, is supported and enhanced by Ukraine's participation in the Council of Europe's Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. Together, they give evidence to Ukraine's authentic interest in European alignment. In order to ensure the conformity of Ukrainian legislation to EU standards, the Law on Local Government was developed within the framework of the European Charter of Local Government (ECLG). Ukraine's ratification of the ECLG (November 1996) represents an important step in the development of a local government system that establishes and respects the standards, foundations, and conditions under which local responsibilities are exercised in alignment with EU principles. Council of Europe member states that have ratified this document believe that the right of citizens to take part in public administration is a common democratic principle.

This Charter, the first European platform for local government, outlines:

- the concept of local government and its legal foundations;
- administrative structures and local government resources; and
- the principles governing administrative supervision of the activities and the financial resources of local authorities.

This document consolidates the international experience on local government, and defines the principles of protection and maintenance of local democracy, decentralisation, and local authority independence. This is clearly an important international commitment that Ukraine has made, and must be supported by strategic technical assistance that ensures its implementation.

## Challenges for local government reform

Despite the fact that the local government model in Ukraine has been conceptually based on EU principles and is already governed by legislation, the majority of the proclaimed principles is still only declarative. In fact, the majority of projects targeting local government reform did not begin in Ukraine until 1996—unlike Poland, where the first initiatives began in the early 1990s. Reform in this sector was one of the first pri-

orities of Poland's newly elected government.<sup>6</sup> In Ukraine, the slow start has impeded the development of reforms in this sector.

Furthermore, development of democratic local government in Ukraine has been hampered during the transformation period because of a lack of strategic institutional reform. This neglect leaves the still-present and func-

<sup>6</sup> Pawel Swianiewicz, "Sympathetic Disengagement: Public Perception of Local Governments in Poland", in *Public Perception of Local Governments*, Pawel Swianiewicz (ed.), LGI Books (OSI 2001), p.173.

tioning totalitarian government system in a situation of impunity and stasis. The government does not have democratic procedures or skills to deal with its citizens, nor do the citizens possess the know-how to monitor their government. For instance, it has taken a long time for fundamental procedures of

government financial transparency to evolve. This initiative mainly originated with the central government, and therefore transparency has significantly increased at that level; however, local governments are still less transparent and accountable, resulting in inefficiency of local public services provision.

## Symptoms of local government reform problems

Local government in Ukraine is rife with the following problems:

- poor quality of service delivery at the local level;
- lack of public control over local authorities' decision making and budget execution;
- government and citizens confused about their role, responsibilities, and functions;
- lack of knowledge and information about the role of local government;
- lack of transparency and accountability;
- lack of citizen participation and influence on decision-making processes;
- lack of policy planning and public policy skills in decision-making processes;
- democracy implemented at the municipal level clashes and does not integrate with the presence of central authorities in the raions and oblasts; and
- low level of economic initiative leads to depressed living standards and high unemployment.

## Causes of the failures

Local self-government is guaranteed in the Constitution of Ukraine, but at the same time, the Constitution authorises the central government to also make and execute local government decisions at the regional level (oblasts, raions). This problem is critical and must be clearly understood. In cities and towns, newly elected bodies and their executive bodies have been created, and this decentralisation has been supported by targeted technical assistance. In these instances, the democratic system begins to function in local government bodies. However, there is an enormous problem with the role of the central government at the local level; this problem has received only partial strategic assistance.

On the other hand, in Poland the voivodship have been newly reconstructed and possess a growing understanding of their new functions. Supported by technical as-

sistance from the EU, this level of government received manuals, training, and twinning resources that facilitated their ability to implement new procedures and activities. This work goes forward in an environment of long-term planning and project design that ensures these new skills take root. In Ukraine, there is a lack of understanding as to how to fulfil this new role; and there are insufficient projects to develop the capacity of the central government's role under the newly democratic conditions of local self-government.

How can legitimate democratic interaction be promoted between the levels of government? In Poland, this dilemma is being resolved by targeted, strategic EU assistance; in Ukraine, these needed reforms are neglected or incomplete. For instance, Poland has new terms of reference for its government officials, at all levels, whereas in Ukraine the

functions are duplicated and mixed. At present, for instance, the centrally appointed oblast state administration is endowed with executive authority for the oblast's elected rada. Such partial reforms of the legislative and administrative systems do not allow a clear division of functions between local government bodies, and contributes to the chaos and dysfunction of the system. The oblast state administration should exist, and is legitimate in the capacities of monitoring, controlling, and implementing the law, the central government's policies, and the central

government's budget resources. But the central government's representatives require assistance with implementing their newly democratic role in these areas. The boundaries need to be identified, training and twinning implemented, and networks created to enable the capacity of all government officials to get on with their new jobs.

Therefore, technical assistance in Ukraine must target the gaps and deficiencies identified above, in order to build the capacity of local government bodies.

# Research Methodology

## Database

The first step in the research process was the creation of the database template (Table 2). This work was carried out collaboratively with our Polish partners; together we refined the template into a two-part version. The first part addresses information relevant to the donor's country strategy, and the second concerns individual projects. The

information sought, when available, gives a comprehensive perspective of donor activity in Ukraine and Poland, in the framework of local government initiatives. Further, once compiled, the data provides a basis upon which to apply the four principles outlined in the CDF paradigm.

*Table 2. Database*

1. Donor	14. Oblast
2. General information (type / legal status of institution, authorities, decision-making process, contacts)	15. Executing agency
3. Mission, strategic objectives for activities	16. Local partner
4. Overall funding	17. Goal
5. Plans for the future	18. Objectives
6. Forms of activities	19. Type of activity
7. Main programs / projects	20. Brief description
8. Program title	21. Budget
9. Project name	22. Outputs
10. Sector	23. Outcomes
11. Start date	24. PCA criteria implementation (Ukraine)
12. End date	25. Reports / publications
13. City	26. Website
	27. Additional information

## Approach

In preparation for this report, research was conducted (during October–December 2001) using a qualitative methodology, based upon donor contacts only. Individual project directors were typically not consulted, due to limited time constraints or the fact that projects were completed and further information was unavailable.

The qualitative methodology used was:

1. In-depth interviews;
2. Content analysis;
3. Comparative analysis.

The first stage of the information gathering process was to send out a letter to the target donors, asking them to provide information about relevant projects, reports upon project realisation, and project evaluations (Table 3).

The letter delineated the overall purpose of the project and its expected outcomes. The response rate was 35%; thus, the necessity to re-contact donors arose. The final response rate increased to 67%. Further, only 2 of the originally contacted 12 donors (17%) agreed to have a personal meeting with the project researcher, in order to discuss the above-mentioned issues more precisely. In

all, a variety of methods was used to obtain the needed information, with a variety of successes (see Table 4, Annex).

*In-depth interview*

This type of data collection differs from the in-person survey, in which a fixed set of questions is asked verbally. The in-depth interview, while focused, is discursive and allows the researcher and respondent to explore any given issue, leaving room for the discussion to occur in a flexible setting. Moreover, an in-depth interview fulfils the following objectives:

- explores the boundaries of a problem;
- obtains evidence for a problem or issue;
- directs the research process itself.

The ICPS researcher chose this method, in order to better understand the donor’s perceptions, opinions, facts, and reactions to the initial findings, as well as the potential recommendations this research would posit. The interviewees were asked:

- To provide a list of completed projects for the period 1991–2001;
- Were evaluations conducted?

- Were final reports publicly available?
- What procedures and methodology were used for over-all strategy creation?
- Were criteria established to measure project assessment?
- Did coordination with other donors occur?
- Did coordination with governments and/or government documents occur?

The conversation was guided by questions focused on donor strategy in Ukraine. Therefore, the interview provided a forum to discuss the procedures according to which the donor’s strategy is elaborated, what effectiveness criteria are applied, if any, and the accountability and consistency of the general mission of donor’s activity to both the goals of separate projects and to Ukraine’s PCA. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, the response rate for the interview was low.

*Content analysis*

The hypothesis of this research was that successful project realisation requires coordination between both country and donor goals and objectives and individual project

*Table 3. Donors*

Bilateral Programs	International Programs
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Department for International Development (DFID, Britain), including the British Know How Fund (BKHF)	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES, Germany)	World Bank (WB, Washington)
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS, Germany)	
MATRA Program (Netherlands)	
International Renaissance Foundation (IRF, New York/Budapest)	
Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)	
Tacis (European Union)	
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)	



outputs and outcomes. We were interested in determining what the Ukrainian government needs to know in order to proactively reform the technical assistance strategy in Ukraine; and our touchstone for this was local government reform. However, due to the difficulty in acquiring current and complete information, the research was hampered by a lack of information, including in important areas such as:

- projects goals, objectives;
- project outputs and outcomes.

Nevertheless, the data obtained certainly indicate trends in donor strategy and project implementation that are important for enabling government documents to coordinate and regulate assistance in Ukraine. The main

sources of donor information were found in materials directly provided by the donors, as well as materials provided to the public by the donors and governments; and web-sites.

### *Comparative analysis*

The comparative analysis pointed out places of coordination and differences between technical assistance in Poland and in Ukraine. It crossed the borders between the two states in order to search out information that could enable the development process in the local self-government domain. The conclusions and recommendations are therefore based upon this shared information and are directed towards providing recommendations that stem from a strategic, dialogic plan for the future.

# Research Findings from the Database

It is important to acknowledge here the difficulty faced in gathering information from donors. This problem was exacerbated by the fact that some did not want to release any information at all, and others did not have good access to information about their own activities; finally, some older data was no longer available. Therefore, we recognise that not all the research is up-to-date. If we could have received current information, the data and our analysis might have been different. However, based on what we obtained, the conclusions were accurate; and the fact that we could not get comprehensive information actually supports the conclusions and leads to the recommendations.

## *Donor mission and strategic objectives*

**UKRAINE.** In general, the mission and objectives of donors for Ukraine can be stated as follows:

- to strengthen Ukraine's capacity for democratic governance and market economy;
- to assist in this transformation from a closed to an open society.

**POLAND.** In general, the mission and objectives of donors for Poland can be stated as follows:

- to prepare Poland for EU membership through the implementation of the Copenhagen Criteria and the adoption of the *acquis*; and
- to implement a pre-accession focus based on the priorities outlined in Poland's Accession Partnership.

## *Forms of activity*

The information from the donor strategies did not typically specify forms of activity; the exceptions were in Ukraine: CIDA, MATRA, and UNDP. The following is based on information from individual projects implemented under the framework of the strategy and in the sector of local government reform.

**UKRAINE:**

- policy advice;
- seminars, conferences, roundtables; and
- short-term study tours and training.

Taking into account the collected data, it can be said that significant projects were implemented in Ukraine, such as LARGIS (supported by DFID) and People's Voice (supported by CIDA and World Bank). The problem is that all these projects were 'pilot' but none of them were continued (lack of long-term vision), and none of them covered all of Ukraine; there was no holistic vision of how these projects sum up into a system.

Donor	Project/Program Name	Type of Activity
USAID	Administrative Reform in Ukraine and the Polish Experience: Legislative, Information and Educational Aspect	1. Research; 2. Seminars; 3. Publications
CIDA, World Bank	People's Voice	1. Advisory; 2. Training; 3. Seminars

#### **POLAND:**

- creation of policy documents, manuals, and regulations;
- system of training for adoption of the new EU regulations (legislative issues);
- launching a nationwide system of training in order to adopt new standards in specific fields; and
- twinning (see Box, p. 33).

Donor	Project/ Program Name	Type of Activity
USAID	Local Government Partnership Program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Subcontracting with reputable Polish firms actively engaged in LGPP everyday work, which after 2000 continue to provide local government with training, and consulting.</li> <li>– Rigorous pre-qualification process to recruit Polish local government support organisations, including training and academic institutions, consulting companies, NGOs, and professional associations to subcontract for LGPP tasks.</li> <li>– Providing state-of-the-art training to Polish firms, dissemination of information, creating a clearinghouse of local government resources, and working together with partnering institutions, to assure that gminas are offered a choice of professional services that meet world standards.</li> <li>– Administering the LGPP grant program.</li> </ul>
Phare	Phare 2000	Series of 90 trainings for local authorities (4,000 participants); series of trainings for 90 trainers.

### *Reports / publications*

**UKRAINE.** Only 12 projects of 62 (19%) specified the creation of reports and publications as part of the project implementation. Examples of the best practices, which provided the project recipients with materials (manuals, analytical paper, reports and other publications), are listed below. Moreover, these materials are accessible on the web pages of the organisations that were implementing the projects.

Donor	Project/ Program Name	Reports or Publications
World Bank, CIDA	People's Voice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Newsletter—a quarterly description and review of project activity.</li> <li>2. Survey of the quality of public services—surveys of public services provided to the population and entrepreneurs.</li> <li>3. Press releases—informational reports about different project initiatives.</li> </ul>

Donor	Project/Program Name	Reports or Publications
		4. Analytical research—conducted in different sphere of public life. 5. Analytical papers—research conducted under the framework of a single initiative.
USAID	Administrative Reforms in Ukraine and the Polish Experience: Legislative, Information and Educational Aspect	Brochure “European Choice: Polish and Ukrainian Experience in Implementing Administrative Reforms” with a print-run of 200,000 copies to be published and disseminated among other governmental, legislative bodies and leading national and regional mass media.
PAUCI/ USAID	Public Sector Capacity Building to Accelerate Reforms in Ukraine	Manuals for 150 project participants, brochures, final report.

**POLAND.** All projects specified the creation of reports and publications as part of the project implementation. Here are examples of so-called institutional memory (in the form of manuals for gminas, powiats and wojewodships) left after projects were implemented:

Donor	Project/ Program Name	Reports or Publications
USAID	Local Government Partnership Program	<p><b>SERIES OF MANUALS FOR GMINAS:</b></p> <p><b>Integrated Financial Management</b></p> <p>“Integrated Gmina Management” Krzysztof Pakonski</p> <p>“Capital Investment Plans” Darek Smialkowski i Rafal Stanek</p> <p>“Budget” Krzysztof Pakonski, ed.</p> <p>“Creditworthiness Assessment” Krzysztof Cichocki</p> <p>“Infrastructure and Money” Rafal Stanek &amp; Bartlomiej Sypien</p> <p>“Restructuring Municipal Services” Marian Szymanowicz, ed.</p> <p><b>Other LGPP publications:</b></p> <p>“Contracting out of Municipal Services” Katarzyna Ostaszewska</p> <p>“From Communication to Cooperation” Mirosław Warowicki, ed.</p> <p>“Local Government Publications Catalogue, 3rd revised edition” Municipium SA commissioned by LGPP</p> <p>“Public Private Partnership in Municipal Services” Marian Moszoro, ed.</p> <p>“Restructuring of Municipal Housing Stock Management” Maciej Tertelis</p> <p>“Local Housing Strategies” Aleksandra Czyzewska, ed.</p> <p>“Catalogue of Local Government Consulting Organisations” Marcin Giebultowski, education.</p> <p>“Strategic Planning of Economic Development” Norton Berman, ed.</p> <p>“Cooperation and Communication in Local Communities” collective work Anna Wiktorowska, ed.</p> <p>“Local Government Publications Catalogue, 2nd revised edition”</p> <p>“Property Management Software” Jan Krzysztof Pieta CPM Cesar Marciano</p> <p>“Economic Development Strategies of Cities and Gminas” collective work edited by Stefan Klosowski</p>
British Know How Fund	Local Government Assistance Program	<p>Manuals: “Housing Manual”, “Land Management”, “Manual for Housing Condominiums”, “Management of Education”, “Research on the Impact of Different Investments in Rural Infrastructure on the Welfare of the Rural Population”, “Core Values of Local Government and Local Democracy”, “Case Studies”, “The Audit Manual”, “Municipal Services Management”, “European Integration”,</p>

Donor	Project/ Program Name	Reports or Publications
		“Local Strategies for Economic Development”, “Management in Gminas”
British Know How Fund	Local Government Assistance Program	<p>Manuals on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Financial Management, prepared by Coopers &amp; Lybrand and Lublin Business School, published in 1994;</li> <li>– Conduct of Council Business, prepared by Coopers &amp; Lybrand and School of Entrepreneurship and Management, Krakow Economic Academy, 1994;</li> <li>– Land Management, prepared by Llewellyn Davies and Institute of Physical Planning and Municipal Economy Krakow, 1994 (second, revised edition published in 1996);</li> <li>– Local Economic Development Strategies, prepared by Chesterton International, School for Advanced Urban Studies and Foundation of Social and Economic Initiatives, 1995;</li> <li>– Housing Management, prepared by Halcrow Fox and Habitat Warszawa, 1996;</li> <li>– Control of Local Government Finance, prepared by the Audit Commission and Polish Regional Audit Offices, 1996 (second, revised edition published in 1998).</li> </ul>

### *Criteria implementation: PCA / APA<sup>7</sup>*

Of the 62 projects in our survey of Ukrainian TA, not one mentioned PCA criteria implementation. Meanwhile, in Poland 50% of the projects directly mention coordination under the framework of the APA.

### *Plans for the future*

**UKRAINE.** 42% (5 of 12) donors did not state future plans.

**POLAND.** All of the donors released information about their future plans for assistance in Poland's accession to the EU.

### *Main local government reform programs/projects*

**UKRAINE.** 50% (6 of 12) donors released this information.

**POLAND.** All of the donors released information about their main programs/projects.

### *Geographical coverage of local government reform projects by city / oblast / voivodship*

The data reveal that 30% of Ukrainian oblasts, in comparison with 62% of Polish voivodships, are covered by local government projects. Further, 34% of Ukrainian and 32% of Polish projects do not specify their location (see Table 5, Annex).

It is also worth mentioning that even if projects were implemented in several administrative units of Poland, it was anticipated that the approach (information, methodology and products in form of manuals) would be passed to other gminas, powiats and wojewodships through

<sup>7</sup> For full details see Table 7, Annex.

planned training programs. All projects supported by the European Commission through Phare covered almost all regions (województws). None of the Polish regions was left without technical assistance (see table as an example).

Donor	Project/ Program Name	Implementa- tion Period	City, Regions
Phare	Phare Local Initiatives Program (Program Inicjatyw Lokalnych Phare)—program was a part of Phare Social-Economic Development Program Pg111	I. 1993–VI. 1996	9 gminas nationwide—Bilgoraj, Działdowo, Kutno, Lubawka, Nidzica, Starachowice, Ustrzyki, Wicks, Zelow.
Phare	Phare—CREDO	1996–2001	6 border regions—Russian, Lithuanian, Belorussian, Ukrainian, Slovak, Czech.
Phare	Phare—Struder	1993–1997	The program covered 6 voivodeships—Lodzkie, Walbrzyskie, Rzeszowskie, Suwalskie, Olsztynskie and Katowickie.
Phare	Phare—Struder II	1999–2000	Apart from the 10 voivodeships that benefited from the STRUDER and RAPID programs (i.e. Lodzkie, Katowickie, Walbrzyskie, Rzeszowskie, Suwalskie, Olsztynskie, Piotrkowskie, Sieradzkie, Krosnienskie and Nowosadeckie), STRUDER 2 covered also former voivodeships of Elblaskie, Koszalinskie, Lomzynskie and Zamojskie.
Phare	Phare—RAPID (Rural Areas Program for Infrastructure and Development)	1996–1999	10 voivodships, 6 voivodships where the program Phare—Struder was formerly implemented (Lodz, Katowice, Walbrzych, Rzeszow, Suwalki, Olsztyn, as well as 4 additional voivodships of Piotrkow Trybunalski, Krosno, Nowy Sacz and Sieradz.
Phare	Phare—INRED (Integrated Regional Development)	1998–2000	Area covered by the Malopolska Program of Rural and Agricultural Development (which involves 3 regions: Malopolskie, Podkarpackie and Swietokrzyskie). After the territorial organization reform, the main beneficiaries of the program were following voivodships: Lubuskie, Kujawsko-Pomorskie, Malopolskie, Podkarpackie, Pomorskie, Slaskie, Swietokrzyskie, Warminsko-Mazurskie and Zachodniopomorskie.

Almost 90% of British Know How Fund moneys were given to support the development of Polish gminas and powiats all around the country (nationwide). For more information, see tables below:

Donor	Project/ Program Name	Implementation Period	City, Regions	Website
British Know How Fund	Local Government Assistance Program	February 1992–31 March 2001	Gminas nationwide	<a href="http://www.cofund.org.pl/khf">www.cofund.org.pl/khf</a>

Donor	Project/Program Name	Implementation Period	City, Regions
British Know How Fund	Local Government Assistance Program	Phase I April 1992– March 1995	Gminas nationwide
British Know How Fund	LAGP Phase II— Development of the training and consultancy network	Phase II (April 1995– September 1998)	Gminas nationwide
British Know How Fund	LAGP Phase II— Manuals upgrade	Phase II (April 1995– September 1998)	Gminas nationwide
British Know How Fund	LAGP Phase III— Powiaty: Support for Public Administration Reform in Poland	Phase III October 1998– March 2001	Powiats nationwide

Projects supported by USAID, the most presented donor in Poland in the mid-1990s, were also covering almost all Polish administrative units. See details in the table below.

Donor	Project/Program Name	Implementation Period	City, Regions
USAID	Local Government Partnership Program	1997–2001	45 partner gminas nationwide
USAID	Democratic Governance and Public Administration (DGPA)	1995–1999	Local governments nationwide

## *Overall funding*

**UKRAINE.** 58% (7 of 12) donors stated the amounts (or part of their budget) spent in the country over the period of 1991–2001, unless otherwise indicated, to support their overall development objectives:

### Disclosed:

- DFID: BPS 16m
- World Bank: USD 2,892m (1992–2000)
- OSCE: EUR 210,000 (2001)
- Tacis: ECU 538m (1996–1999)
- CIDA: USD 228m
- IRE: USD 31,712,775 (1997–1999)
- SIDA: SEK 60m

### Not disclosed:

- USAID
- UNDP
- MATRA
- Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
- Konrad Adenauer Stiftung

**POLAND.** Four out of the five donors to local government reform projects stated funds spent in the country over the period covered, to support their overall development objectives:

#### Disclosed:

- British Know How Fund:  
BPS 100,000,000
- PHARE: ECU 153,748m (1990–1996),  
ECU 1,015m (1995–1999)
- USAID: USD 960,543,769
- World Bank: USD 500,130,200


#### Not disclosed:

- UNDP Umbrella Project
- Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
- CIDA


Some donors were not able to provide our experts with information related to the total funds granted both to Poland and Ukraine. Moreover, almost 50% of the information about the budgets of the projects was not disclosed.

### *Project budgets (USD)<sup>8</sup>*

#### UKRAINE



#### POLAND



In Ukraine, 46% of the information about project budgets was not specified. Projects supported in Ukraine were mostly small and medium (in amounts of 1,000–5,000 USD or 5,001–15,000 USD); only 10% of the technical assistance was given in the range 15,001–1 million USD, and 10% for projects over 1 million USD.

On the surface, it can be asserted that Ukraine received almost the same amount of technical assistance as Poland, but below we would like to focus on the quality of this assistance.

In Poland, 36% of the information about project budgets was not specified. It is interesting to note that most of Polish projects were large grants (from 15,001–1 million USD) and very large projects (over 1 million USD).

Taking into account the information about the length of the projects in Poland (see table about project duration) and amount of assistance, it can be concluded that the Polish projects reflected the existence of long-term holistic vision in the country (see CDF criteria).

<sup>8</sup> For full details see Table 6, Annex.



## Number of projects in local government reform

The number of local government projects implemented in both countries was almost similar—62 in Ukraine and 78 in Poland. Still, there was an utter difference in the quality of the projects in terms of project methodology, geographical coverage, outputs and outcomes planned and achieved, and project duration; this will be analysed below.

### UKRAINE

Donor	Number of projects
<i>Bilateral</i>	
DFID	0
CIDA	4
FES	0
KAS	0
MATRA	9
SIDA	2
USAID	19
European Union (Takis)	0
<i>International</i>	
IRF	25
OSCE	0
UNDP (Umbrella)	0
World Bank	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>62</b>


### POLAND

Donor	Number of projects
<i>Bilateral</i>	
BKHF	14
CIDA	9
FES	9
KAS	0
MATRA	0
SIDA	0
USAID	23
European Union (Phare)	16
<i>International</i>	
IRF	0
OSCE	0
UNDP (Umbrella)	3
World Bank	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>78</b>


## Project length

Donors operating in Ukraine did not disclose information about the duration of 63% of the projects in the researched field. Among the disclosed information were 16% short-term projects and 21% long-term projects. There was absolutely no information about the existence of mid-term projects in Ukraine. Among donors supporting long-term projects were organisations which mostly support long-term projects—USAID, the World Bank, and CIDA. Other donors were supporting short-term projects, which could be termed ad hoc.

### UKRAINE



### POLAND



Donors operating in Poland did not disclose information about the duration of only 14% of projects in the researched field. Among the disclosed information were 27% short-term projects. The data proves the fact that almost all donors were supporting long-term projects in Poland—59% of projects.

## UKRAINE


Donor	Short-term projects (less than 1 year)	Long-term projects (1 year or more)	Not specified
CIDA	0	4	0
DFID	0	2	0
FES	0	0	0
IRF	0	0	25
KAS	0	0	0
MATRA	7	2	0
SIDA	0	1	0
Tacis	0	0	0
USAID	3	3	14
OSCE	0	0	0
UNDP	0	0	0
WB	0	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>39</b>

## POLAND


Donor	Short-term projects (less than 1 year)	Long-term projects (1 year or more)	Not specified
BKHF	0	14	0
CIDA	2	1	6
FES	6	0	3
PHARE	4	11	1
USAID (incl. PAUCI)	3+5=8	15	0
UNDP Umbrella Program	0	2	1
WB	1	3	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>11</b>

### *Project implementation periods<sup>9</sup>*

Years	Ukraine
1991–1995	Unknown
1996–1999	40 projects
2000–2003	8 projects
Not specified	14 of the 62 projects do not specify start/end dates



Years	Poland
1991–1995	20 projects
1996–1999	31 projects
2000–2003	18 projects
Not specified	9 of the 78 projects do not specify start/end dates



### *Goals and objectives for local government reform projects*

The tables given below reflect the information about the goals and objectives specified in the projects implemented in both countries. It would be worth mentioning that not all donors were able to provide us with information about the existence of defined goals and objectives. Sometimes, the information available about the project included the project title and implementation period only; we did not consider such data for our analysis and conclusions. Still, we would like to focus on the qualitative difference of the “goals and objectives” approach in those examples where such data was available.

<sup>9</sup> By starting date.

# UKRAINE

Donor	Both speci- fied	Speci- fied goal only	Specified objec- tives only	Not speci- fied
CIDA	3	0	1	0
DFID	2	0	0	0
FES	0	0	0	0
IRF	0	25	0	0
KAS	0	0	0	0
MATRA	0	9	0	0
SIDA	0	0	0	2
Tacis	0	0	0	0
USAID	6	11	0	2
OSCE	0	0	0	0
UNDP	0	0	0	0
WB	1	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>

# POLAND

Donor	Specified goals and objectives	Not specified
BKHF	14	0
CIDA	9	0
FES	0	9
PHARE	16	0
USAID		
(incl. PAUCI)	4+5=9	14
UNDP		
Umbrella		
Program	3	0
WB	4	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>23</b>

**UKRAINE.** A number of projects had clearly defined goals and objectives. Some of them were devoted to the implementation of concrete changes at the local level, such as drafting municipal laws, or providing training for a group of local officials. Only a few of the projects aimed to provide changes for several regions (oblast centres). The rest of the projects aimed to organise public hearings, conferences, or seminars that did not complement a unified system (see tables below)

Donor	Project/ Program Name	Goal/Objectives
CIDA, World Bank	People's Voice	The main goal of the project is to assist selected cities in Ukraine to reform and improve the quality of their municipal services to households and businesses, and to enhance their level of integrity in the process.
International Renaissance Foundation	Title of the project was not available	The goal of the project is to study the Polish experience of democratisation process and the decentralisation of financial-fiscal relations, to define the index of effectiveness and control of financial decentralisation and public participation in local activities.
International Renaissance Foundation	Title of the project was not available	To develop a Law of Ukraine "On the municipal police".
MATRA	Principles of Local Budgets Formation	To carry out a series of scientific practical workshops and a final national conference concerning the principles of local budget formation. Drafting recommendations to the legislative bodies of Ukraine concerning the new principles of the local budget formation to be enforced by law.

**POLAND.** Polish experts working on this survey remarked that at the beginning of the 1990s, when donors started coming to the country, projects/programs (including goals and objectives) were developed by donors as seen from their point of view. They considered policy advice and recommendations to be the best way of passing on experience and knowledge. But Polish counterparts participating in project/program development process insisted on

developing projects/programs that aimed to implement concrete tasks which would cover all areas (in our case, concerning local government reform) and all administrative units.

Of course, Poland's integration into the European Union played a central role in the development of the "special" form of technical assistance given to the country. Each project implemented in Poland was devoted to preparing the country (in each sphere) for joining the EU.

Projects in the field of local government reform supported by the EU (Phare, ISPA, STRUDER, others) aimed to develop and adjust administrative units to their European counterparts.

Donor	Project/Program Name	Objectives
Phare	Phare Local Initiatives Program (Program Inicjatyw Lokalnych Phare)—program was a part of Phare Social-Economic Development Program Pg111	The program was aimed at creating local development plans for gminas. The plans should not be the outcome of external consulting (work of external experts), but an effect of local community actions and efforts.
Phare	Phare—Struder	The general objective of the program was defined as contribution "to the reconversion and development of regions particularly affected by the restructuring of the economy", the process of restructuring the economies of the selected regions by building relevant tools, mobilising local resources, financial assistance, training and consulting for small and medium enterprises.
Phare	Phare—RAPID (Rural Areas Program for Infrastructure and Development)	Its main objective was to reduce regional disparities by supporting infrastructure development in selected regions whose socio-economic development is lagging behind in relation to the national average.
Phare	Phare—INRED (Integrated Regional Development)	Its main objective was to prepare Polish regions for efficient and effective utilisation of Structural Funds.
Phare	Program Phare 1999 "Human Resources Development" PL 99 IB/OT/01 Polish-French Agreement in cooperation with Portugal and Ireland	The wider objective of the program is to strengthen Polish public administration in the face of Poland's integration with the EU. It is aimed at: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– developing human resources in public administration;</li> <li>– creating structures and procedures improving public services in Poland;</li> <li>– improving integration processes;</li> <li>– preparing government administration for the effective execution of Structural Funds and Regional Development Funds;</li> <li>– developing skills aimed at the implementation of economic strategies.</li> </ul>
Phare	Phare 2000	The main objective of the program is to support the skills and the potential of Polish local governments not only to apply the <i>acquis communautaire</i> to the Polish law system but also to apply it in practice. The direct aim of the program is to specify the new authority and duties connected with the European Community law at the level of gminas and powiats.

Donor	Project/Program Name	Objectives
Phare	Twinning Program; Miasta Blizniacze	Program is addressed at towns, gminas, and local government. Its aim is to support the exchange of people and ideas dealing with specific problems. The actions are conducted in form of cooperation between partner (twin) cities and gminas.

There was no official document signed by all donors supporting projects in Poland that they would support the country on its way to EU, but all the projects were devoted to the development of democracy, rule of law, institutional development, and building infrastructures. USAID, one of the first and biggest donors to Poland, was supporting projects for institutional development, and preparing public administration and local government officials for working with new rules. In the later 1990s projects were supported by PAUCI (through USAID) where Polish experts who were already trained by international experts passed on their experience of reform implementation to their Ukrainian counterparts.

Donor	Project/ Program Name	Goal/Objectives
USAID	Democratic Governance and Public Administration (DGPA)	Program was initially focused on capacity building for the four major local government associations and expanded to include technical assistance to the Central Government in fiscal decentralisation and public administration reform; The technical assistance to local government associations provided for institutional strengthening and to support formation of the Local Self-Government Analysis System (SAS). The DGPA also focused on financial and technical assistance to training organisations and universities; on initiating and strengthening education programs for local government officials and students contemplating careers in government.

There was also a significant role of donor support to Poland through bilateral agreements—with Britain, Germany and other EU member-states—that supported projects/programs aimed to help Poland in its preparation for EU membership.

Donor	Project/ Program Name	Goal/Objectives
British Know How Fund	Local Government Assistance Program	In the Phase I the LGAP was assisting newly created local governments on the municipal (gmina) level by providing them with manuals and training programs in the key areas of management of local issues.
British Know How Fund	LAGP Phase II— Assistance to Regional Audit Offices (RIO)	The LGAP II assistance for RIO had two dimensions: (i) revisions and updating of the manual prepared in the first phase of the LGAP Program. Such a revised version was prepared with the support of Audit Commission consultants and published in 1998. (ii) training program for RIO staff in order to facilitate efficient everyday use of the manual.
British Know How Fund	LAGP Phase III – European Integration: Polish Local Governments Facing European Integration	This project's aim was to support local governments in Poland in their preparation for EU accession. The project aimed at providing information on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– legal obligations of local governments in European Union – such as related to various local services and related to environmental protection, consumer protection as well as general obligations related to procurement, labour codes etc.</li> <li>– accessing European funds available for local and regional authorities.</li> </ul>

Donor	Project/ Program Name	Goal/Objectives
British Know How Fund	LGAP Phase III—Public Investment in Rural Infrastructure	<p>1. Research on the impact of different investments in rural infrastructure on the welfare of the rural population (with particular reference to the poorer social groups). This was carried out between June 1998 and January 1999 by Instytut Rozwoju Wsi i Rolnictwa PAN (the Institute for Development of Village and Agricultural). As a result, an in-depth report was prepared.</p> <p>2. Preparation of a manual, devising course materials and conducting pilot training schemes on the subject of preparation, appraisal and monitoring of public investments in rural areas. The manual contains information of how to prepare, appraise and monitor investments and also information concerning requirements and means of application for funds from the EU, including the SAPARD, and the World Bank.</p>

### *Outputs and outcomes for local government reform projects*

Expressions such as “outputs” and “outcomes” were not clearly defined and used by the NGO community of countries in transition in the mid-1990s. Only now, experts who submit proposals envision what outputs and outcomes the given projects will lead to, in other words—what results, such as new skills, procedures and standards. As a result, projects will have clear implications—such as increased capacity of local governments to make decisions, involvement of all stakeholders in the discussion of vital problems at the local level, awareness of the public about the policy of central and local government, and public participation in the decision-making process.

#### UKRAINE

Donor	Outputs		Outcomes	
	Specified? Yes	No	Specified? Yes	No
CIDA	1	3	2	2
DFID	2	0	1	1
FES	0	0	0	0
IRF	12	13	0	25
KAS	0	0	0	0
MATRA	3	6	1	8
SIDA	0	2	0	2
Tacis	0	0	0	0
USAID	17	1	7	12
OSCE	0	0	0	0
UNDP	0	0	0	0
WB	1	0	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>50</b>

#### POLAND

Donor	Outputs and outcomes	
	Specified? Yes	No
BKHF	13	1
CIDA	1	8
FES	0	9
PHARE	8	8
USAID		
(incl. PAUCI)	3	15+5 =20
UNDP	3	0
WB		
Umbrella		
Program	2	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>48</b>

**UKRAINE.** Collected data of the projects implemented in Ukraine testify about the fact that only few projects were developed with a preliminary vision of outputs as a concrete expression of the implementation of the goals. Most of the projects did not contain information about the results planned and then achieved.

It is also important to mention the nature of the outputs and outcomes of the Ukrainian projects; most of them (as was mentioned above) were implemented on ad hoc basis and did not come under the country's own strategic framework. Though the word "*capacity*" was often used in recent years' project descriptions, actual outputs were mostly conferences or seminars, drafting a solitary law, or organising study tours for Ukrainian state officials to other countries.

Best practice projects are listed below:

Donor	Project/ Program Name	Outputs/Outcomes
World Bank, CIDA	People's Voice	<p>Outputs: Project brochure, NGO Coalition Ivano-Frankivsk, NGO Coalition Ternopil, Project Initiatives, Ternopil Overview, Ivano-Frankivsk Overview, Municipal Policy Programs, Publications</p> <p>Outcomes: The expected outcomes of the project are twofold.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. It should result in institutionalising reforms at the local level that will improve services and reduce corruption.</li> <li>2. It should put in place mechanisms and processes that strengthen the role of civil society in local governance.</li> </ol> <p>Even if these outcomes are only partially achieved, it would still be a major step forward for Ukraine.</p>
DFID	Academy of Public Administration—Institutional Strengthening—Phase III	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. MPA developed to meet needs of central, regional and local government participants. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.a. New course modules designed and piloted (policy analysis; public policy evaluation; new public management; change management; performance assessment; key aspects of EU Ukraine relationships).</li> <li>1.b. Appropriate training methods and techniques introduced (case-studies; role playing; simulation exercises).</li> <li>1.c. Additional case studies and training materials prepared and piloted for all three participant streams.</li> <li>1.d. Validation and Quality Management by University of North London for all new MPA inclusions.</li> </ol> </li> <li>2. Distance learning MPA developed and available to regional and local government officials in Ukraine.</li> <li>3. Direct contributions to increased efficiency and effectiveness in regional and local government through in-organisation training, applied research and consultancy provided by UAPA.</li> <li>4. Consultancy, applied research and training capacity developed among UAPA alumni for regional and local government, organised through Academy networks or Institute of Municipal Development.</li> <li>5. Enhanced training capacity in Oblast Training Centres catering for officials in grades 5-7.</li> <li>6. UAPA publications on regional and local government development and reform, produced by and supporting the APA work programme (possibly monographs and/or Urban Network Journal).</li> </ol>

Donor	Project/ Program Name	Outputs/Outcomes
USAID	Administrative Reform in Ukraine and the Polish Experience: Legislative, Information and Educational Aspect	The comparative analysis will be conducted and its results used in application of the European standards in legislative, scientific, informational and educational provision necessary for reforming the executive power and local self-government systems in Ukraine. The result of the analysis will be published as well in brochure "European Choice: Polish and Ukrainian Experience in Implementing the Administrative Reform" with a print-run of 200,000 copies and disseminated among other governmental, legislative bodies and leading national and regional mass media. The project implementers will organize a series of round tables and seminars with representatives of Ukrainian central and local government bodies; research institutions and other policy-oriented NGOs. Seminar topics include: separation of powers and divisions of responsibilities among central and local self-government in Poland; regional policymaking; property ownership and management relations between central and local authorities; and a comparison of Ukrainian and Polish legislation regarding local self-government.
CIDA	Capacity Building	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Strengthened capacity of the regional administration in Belogorsk, Bakhchesarai, Simferopol and Sudak, to prepare local development plans and to mobilise resources using the participatory approach;</li> <li>2. Promoted principle of authority decentralization through increased dialogue between the central government and regional administration;</li> <li>3. Improved capacity of the elected Local Participatory Planning Councils to participate in decision making processes at all levels;</li> <li>4. Strengthened capacity of the CIDP's main counterpart—the Republican Committee for Nationalities and Minorities (RESCOMNATS).</li> </ol>

**POLAND.** Project data collected in Poland testifies about the fact that all projects were developed with envisioned outputs and outcomes (however, this information was not available for some projects).

It is also important to mention that the nature and quality of outputs and outcomes envisioned in these projects differed from the Ukrainian examples. Polish projects led to the following results—trained civil servants, created institutions, standards and procedures, developed infrastructure.

Donor	Project/ Program Name	Outputs/Outcomes
USAID	Democratic Governance and Public Administration (DGPA)	DGPA program has helped Poland's four Municipal Associations develop their capacity to represent the interests of local governments in the development of laws and regulations on local governments. Polish leaders and policy makers recognise the Associations as an effective voice for representing local government's interests. To improve the level of public



Donor	Project/Program Name	Outputs/Outcomes
		administration education to help better educate civil servants, the DGPA program assisted four schools of public administration in curriculum development, drawing on U.S. models of public administration curricula. As a result of this assistance, in 1999 these schools created an Association of Polish Schools of Public Administration.
Phare	Phare Local Initiatives Program (Program Inicjatyw Lokalnych Phare)—program was a part of Phare Social-Economic Development Program Pg111	8 local credit funds for SME have been created; over 3,000 people have been trained in training centers in 6 gminas; over 1,000 small enterprises received consulting in law, finance, management and marketing; over 200 local communities' representatives took part in seminars and conferences, 147 people found employment in 27 new firms
Phare	Phare—Struder	The budget of the program was utilized in 100%. As an effect of the activities carried out within the program, more than 11,000 new jobs were created and the value of investment resulting from the program exceeded 130 million euro.
Phare	Phare—Struder II	Phare STRUDER 2 program, as one of several implemented in Poland contributed to increasing the overall level of regional development, and especially meeting standards applicable in the European Union. Among its results were not only numerous infrastructure investments. The program also contributed to raising qualifications of many specialists who deal with the implementation of regional policies on local and regional levels on daily basis, preparing in this way ground for effective implementation of subsequent programs within pre-accession instruments, and last but not least to effective use of structural funds.
Phare	Phare—RAPID (Rural Areas Program for Infrastructure and Development)	Among the effects of the program there is not only creation of 10 regional development strategies and co-financing of 163 infrastructure projects but also know-how transferred to Polish specialists in Warsaw and the regions. Owing to this, they can now effectively implement other programs and to assist gminas in the process of projects' preparation. That is important capital for future, especially in respect to Poland's future accession to the European Union.
British Know How Fund	LAGP Phase II—Development of the training and consultancy network	LGAP network and other results of LGAP program were promoted during a road-show consisting of four seminars for local governments organised in different regions of Poland during Spring 1996. These seminars were organised in: Koszalin, Wroclaw, Bialystok and Krosno. During each seminar LGAP manuals, demonstration projects' results and the training offer were presented. Representatives of over 200 Polish local governments attended seminars.
British Know How Fund	LAGP Phase II—New areas of assistance for local governments	Three new manuals together with training programs and pilot training courses were prepared. The topics of new modules were: – Management of Education (prepared by School of Education, University of Birmingham and Foundation of

Donor	Project/Program Name	Outputs/Outcomes
		Social and Economic Initiatives), published in 1998; – Management of Housing Condominiums (Habitat, Foundation of Social and Economic Initiatives, Association “Housing Condominiums”), 1997; – Management of Municipal Services (Economic and Business Policy Research, Oxford, Gdansk Institute for Market Economics, Lublin Business School), 1998; In addition to these in 1997 LGAP published a book on “Core Values of Local Governments and Local Democracy”. The book aimed at academics, students as well as local government officials.
British Know How Fund	LAGP Phase III— Powiaty: Support for Public Administration Reform in Poland	49 two-day courses, 1000 officers and councilors from over 150 powiats trained.

### *Twinning civil servants is more effective than consulting services*

*During past years, Polish institutions were granted aid in the framework of the PHARE programme mainly in the form of recommendations. In general, such contracts were signed with private advisory agencies in EU countries, and nobody even evaluated whether this type of assistance was effective. Moreover, now it is very difficult to find any information about the money paid to private advisory companies under specific PHARE projects. Poland’s public officials often complained that although foreign advisors assisted in producing high-quality programs, their ignorance of Polish peculiarities hindered the effective realisation of the determined tasks.*

*When the European Union saw that the services of private advisors were expensive, it made the following decision: public officials in the candidate countries should cooperate with their colleagues from EU states. Thus, the twinning approach was developed, requiring officials from the member states to intensively consult with public administrations in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.*

*What is the practical difference between teaching and twinning? Under the “teaching” approach, a technical assistance project would arrange for, say, ten officials to go once to visit a donor country agency. Under the “twinning” approach, assistance would be provided to one key official to have ten visits with his/her counterpart over a period of time, building a working relationship. The main feature of twinning projects is that they set out to deliver specific and guaranteed results, which have been agreed between the parties in advance, for the implementation of priority areas of the acquis.*

*Twinning is focused on four priority sectors of public policy—agriculture, environment, finance, and justice and home affairs; Poland implements projects in line with all four priorities. In the framework of PHARE’98, Poland’s administration established relations with public officials from eight countries. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture closely cooperates with its counterparts in Denmark, Germany, Ireland, France, and the Netherlands.*

*Twinning has many advantages: this approach appears to be as effective, as well as cheaper, compared to the services of highly paid private advisors. Having great practical experience, EU public officials are able to render effective assistance to their counterparts from candidate countries in adapting to the acquis. Importantly, EU experts develop their proposals according to needs, which have been clearly formulated by officials from the candidate countries.*

*Source: Reducing Corruption in Ukraine, ICPS Case Study, June 2001, p. 20.*

# Analysis using CDF criteria

## *Long-term, holistic vision*

Based upon the findings generated in the database research, it becomes clear that in Ukraine, donors do not directly address their technical assistance (TA) strategies or projects to the realisation of the PCA. Concomitantly, because the government of Ukraine does not generate an overall country strategy to guide or regulate donor activity, there is no formal requirement that donors attend to Ukraine's need for implementing the PCA in the agreed-upon timeframe, which was set in collaboration with the EU (2004). Further, Ukraine's lack of legislation on TA, and the predominance of bilateral agreements, increased the confusion in the country's development environment. All of this makes it difficult to design projects that are interconnected and could develop the kind of cumulative mass needed to produce real transformations in local government reform.

These factors obscure a long-term vision of TA that could target directly stated needs. This corroborates the database response rate on "Future plans", where all of the Polish donors indicate a strategic vision for their activities. Their future is clear: EU membership. For instance, in Poland's TA framework for local government reform, it is understood that in the future, the regions will be key recipients and implementors of EU structural programs and funds. Therefore, for instance, these regions have introduced European nomenclature, and each of the 16 regions have already obtained NUTS II status, essential for structural support.<sup>10</sup>

Comparatively, in Ukraine, less than 50% of the donors mention future plans in the documents made available for this research. Similarly, 4 of the 5 Polish donors released information concerning their overall funding

for the country; in Ukraine, only 60% released this information. Finally, in Poland, the donors consistently (100%) supplied information about their current main programs and projects, providing a basis and direction for future work. In Ukraine, only 50% of this information is available. This reduces the possibility of future project design taking into account past and current work and using this information to construct projects which could move local government reforms ahead in a strategic way.

Nevertheless, Ukraine is party to such international agreements as the *European Charter of Local Self-Government*. To meet these international criteria, the need for reform, as a necessary component of democracy building in Ukraine, is critical. Towards this end, one touchstone for coherence is project duration. In Ukraine, 38 of 62 projects in this sector do not release duration information. Of the remaining 24, 10 are one-year projects and 13 are longer than one-year projects. On the other hand, Poland's example indicates a long-term commitment—beginning in the early 1990s, unlike Ukraine—that has created stability, sustainability, and accountability.

Commitment to this vision of local governance is matched by funding priorities. In Ukraine, donors do not release information about 28 project budgets; 21 are for less than 15,000 USD, and 13 initiatives could be classified as large projects. In Poland, both the consistency of funding and the overall country coverage of the projects disclose commitment to realising reforms in this sector. Every Polish region has or has had projects which help them to develop their infrastructure and institutions. In Ukraine, only 7 oblasts of 27 have had local governance initiatives. In fact, most of the projects are located in Western or Central Ukraine; Eastern Ukraine is under-represented. The available data for the varia-

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<sup>10</sup> Poland's PPCI draft report, p 5.

bles of project design, length, and funding capacities indicate an impediment to a long-term, holistic vision in local government reform in Ukraine.

### *Country ownership*

The principle of country ownership enshrined in the CDF includes not simply government consultations, but also civil society and dialogue with the private sector in project design and implementation. In this best of worlds, all the stakeholders are consulted and have their say in setting out development priorities. Once again, the general lack of coordination between the Ukrainian government and these relevant parties, starting at the level of establishing a national strategy and extending downward through to individual projects, is also evident in local government initiatives. Although some projects in Ukraine target reforms for civil society and the private sector, public consultation is not the norm and therefore not typically included at any step of the process. The results of this lack of dialogue are evident in, for instance, the legislative and systemic confusion which impedes the reforms made in local government. One example: the new Budget Code of Ukraine cannot be implemented because the other necessary parts of a budget reform environment have not been undertaken.

On the other hand, country ownership is a necessary requirement of Poland's strategy for EU membership. The APA sets out what is needed in local government reform, and these needs are benchmarked with projected dates of fulfilment (ultimately, 2004). In this context, local government projects cover 50% (8 of 16) more spheres of activity than Ukrainian projects, and therefore involve 50% more stakeholders in civil society and the private sector. As well, during 1994–1997, the Polish need for know-how, solutions, and the mechanisms necessary for a properly functioning government was iden-

tified and acted upon. TA targeted providing “Polish civil servants and businessmen with knowledge and experience related to solutions applied in particular sectors (agriculture, banking, etc), as well as general knowledge, mainly in the area of planning, management, monitoring and evaluation.”<sup>11</sup>

Following this period of activity, Poland began shaping its TA environment according to the priorities of EU membership, through establishing structures and mechanisms to regulate this development work. In 1998, foundational planning documents were developed, such as the Draft of the National Development Plan and the National Accession Strategy. These reports provide a “map” that outlines Polish transformation; the guideposts are provided by the APA and the *National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis*, in which the main goals are precisely stated.<sup>12</sup> Country ownership of local government reform—supported by projects covering a wide range of sectors, many of which are long-term initiatives begun in the early 1990s and extending into 2001—is producing sustainable democratic reform results in Poland's local government bodies, which is consistently conforming to the EU's clearly stated standards.

### *Partnership*

Of the 62 projects in our survey of Ukrainian TA, not one mentioned PCA criteria implementation. Meanwhile, in Poland 50% of the projects directly mention coordination under the framework of the APA; this has created an environment of coherence for government reform in Poland, as all initiatives seek to fulfil the same mandate—EU membership. Working together with the EU in partnership to achieve these concretely stated aims, the consistency of government reform at each level ultimately enables all levels. Because everyone is moving in the same direction, changes in the system are able to be consistent and across the board; as a result, the machinery of Polish govern-

<sup>11</sup> Polish PPCI draft report, p. 6.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

ment moves together in consonance. Declared goals and expectations are concretely outlined, the actual assistance to the country makes it possible for these goals to be fulfilled, and Poland steadily moves towards the achievement of accession.

In Ukraine, the results are indicative of the overall lack of alignment between the government and the international donor community, impeding the creation of a “partnership” environment and therefore limiting the depth and sustainability of local government reforms. Further, because the design of the reforms is not systematic, changes—even positive ones—made in one place clash with the still-prevalent Soviet system, and the entire process breaks down. This produces, among other things, enormous discouragement and lack of trust in the reform process.

However, an interview with the Head of the Bilateral Cooperation Department (Ministry of Economy and European Integration of Ukraine) offered some hope, although access to project registration lists and documents was not permitted. Since 1999, there has been a notable change in partnership building, as all donors now discuss their strategies with the government of Ukraine. For instance, since 1999 USAID has been participating in concrete discussions with government committees in the different spheres relevant to their vision. In 2001, the Netherlands, the UK, Canada, and the USA all reviewed their country strategies in light

of the emerging political and economic situation in Ukraine. As a result, the environment is slowly evolving towards a more partnership-focused paradigm, which is, in turn, leading to better-developed strategies.

The Ukrainian government has implemented the following procedure, as a step towards taking the lead in managing aid coordination:

1. Donor creates a draft strategy and submits it to the government;
2. Government comments and makes suggestions;
3. Discussions are held between the two stakeholders to finalise document, with the final decision lying with the donor;
4. Donor announces a tender for projects;
5. Discussion on how the strategy will be implemented through the projects selected does not include the Ukrainian government (see Box).

These new initiatives bode well for the realisation of this third principle of the CDF paradigm and therefore offer hope for improvements in TA implementation in Ukraine; they are creating a framework for bilateral aid in Ukraine. However, along with this newly dialogic situation, the government must begin to produce a national strategy that outlines, from Ukraine’s perspective, the transformation needs the country is facing and includes consultations with all stake-

### *Bilateral agreements limit Ukrainian participation in decision-making*

*Procedural norms under the framework of bilateral agreements are often faulty. The Ukrainian side is not able to govern the process of determining a list of specific projects and their content, nor of choosing project contractors and Ukrainian grantees.*

*For example, in December 1999 the National Agency of Ukraine for Development and European Integration (NAUDEI) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) signed an international agreement on forming and approving bilateral TA programs. This agreement specifies that only priority areas of aid should be coordinated with the Ukrainian side, while the American side unilaterally defines the list of specific projects, their contents, project contractors, and even the Ukrainian grantees. USAID applies to the state project registration authority on its own or through the Ukrainian recipient already chosen by the American agency.*

holders. This document must set out requirements defined by the PCA and target benchmarks that will indicate criteria fulfilment. To that end, in May 2000 the Department created a draft resolution for the common coordination of all TA activities in Ukraine, to be approved by the Cabinet of Ministers in 2002. In accordance with this resolution, the beneficiary will define the criteria of project success. The ratification of this document will be a strong step towards laying the groundwork for local government project design that is coordinated and coherent, with more chances for achieving good results.

### *Development results*

Here, it must again be underscored that there were impediments to information access in 80% of the donors contacted in Ukraine; and it was impossible to gain access to document information, such as the registration list for projects, in the government. Nevertheless, the donors involved in this research all provided information relating to their overall mission and strategic objectives for their development work, in Poland and Ukraine. These missions point towards enabling the transition in both countries towards democracy and market economy. The question is: what correlation exists between a project's stated goals and objectives and its outputs and outcomes?

Our research indicated that of the 62 projects conducted in Ukraine, 19% (12) specify both goals and objectives. These projects therefore designed a framework that facilitated concrete realisation of the donor's overall mission. Conversely, 7% (4 of the 62) did not state any goal or objective, and 73% (45) provided only goals.

Concerning outputs and outcomes, 40% (25) projects did not specify outputs—the concrete result of project work—and 81% (50) did not specify outcomes. This indicates a serious problem in project design.

Without clearly stated targets and delineated, measurable achievements, it is impossible to count on project success. This undercuts the potential achievements of technical assistance to local government in Ukraine.

In contrast, the link between these criteria is more consistently shown in the data from Poland, where 55 projects (71% of the total) specified objectives; further, 38% identified outcomes, pointing to the direct results of project realisation. While these figures are not exemplary, they reveal a trend towards stronger project design within a framework and results that will achieve donor mission criteria for future EU membership. To assist Poland in this kind of accountability work, in 1998 the government began to collect information on support programs realised in Poland and financed by the EU.<sup>13</sup>

Aside from matters of project design, an important sphere of work for local governments lies in providing efficient and effective public services for their constituencies. It is important to note that capacity building in this area represents a very small aspect of the overall work being done in Ukrainian projects. In Poland, on the other hand, institution and infrastructure building are the key areas supported by the EU in local government reform. PHARE focuses on disseminating EU procedures in order to ensure Polish preparation for accession, and uses twinning as the mechanism to provide skills-based training at all levels of government reform. In Ukraine, the predominance of advice only or one-off seminars and conferences, undercuts the cumulative effect of project work. In projects that do line up their goals and objectives with activities, outputs, and outcomes that work together in consonance, the effect is positive. But the strength of these well-designed projects is dissipated by the lack of a system; project isolation weakens the sustainability of the reforms.

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<sup>13</sup> Poland PPCI draft report, p. 1.

## Examples of good practice

Poland's reform achievements in local government have made a concrete difference in the country's transformation process (see Box). Project design, under the framework of the APA, typically also complies with the effectiveness criteria of the World Bank's CDE. A snapshot of several projects, provided below, discloses the areas of connection and accounts for the sustainable growth and development in this sector.

### *Long-term, holistic vision*

In Poland, the work of the British Know How Fund provides a strong example of the benefits of implementing a long-term, holistic vision that is balanced and non-discrete. Their Local Government Assistance Programme (LGAP) began in February 1992 and extended through to March 2001. The LGAP was implemented in three phases. Phase 1's objective was to assist the newly created local governments, at the gmina level, by providing them with manuals and training programs in their key areas of management. In Phase 2, the original five centres of work were increased to nine and involved training-the-trainer programs, network institutions, and mechanisms to facilitate the dissemination of information; this phase also included an upgrade of the manuals produced in Phase 1, new demonstration projects to instruct others on how to use the manuals, and the creation of a collection and analysis system on performance in the delivery of local services. Phase 3 of the program directly focuses on legal support to the gminas for fulfilling their legal obligations in the EU, in such related areas as local service provision, environmental protection, consumer protection, procurement, labour codes, etc. Outputs include booklets and training courses, standard forms for reports, and creation of a database.

### *Country ownership*

The EU's PHARE program provides concrete examples of ways to include a broad sector of

stakeholders in the implementation of development work. This six-year project—the PHARE Local Initiatives Program—aimed at creating local development plans for gminas that were designed by the local communities themselves. The sectoral coverage was broad and covered government, civil society, and the private sector: local development, SMEs, services, tourist industry, education, culture, and employment.

The outputs reveal a concrete impact in these areas:

- 8 credit funds for SMEs were created;
- 3,000 people were trained;
- 1,000 small enterprises received legal, financial, management, and marketing consultation;
- 200 community representatives were trained during special seminars and conferences;
- 147 people were employed in 27 newly established firms.

A second project under this framework—the Rural Areas Program for Infrastructure and Development (RAPID), realised in 1996–1999—facilitated additional collaboration on the fulfilment of the “country ownership” criteria. The outputs of this project include not only the creation of 10 regional development strategies and co-financing of 163 infrastructure projects, but also the skills transferred to Polish specialists in Warsaw and the regions. As a result, this project can be effectively implemented in other gminas, across sectors which are important to Poland's future accession to the EU.

### *Partnership*

The UNDP's Umbrella Program provides an example of project design that establishes a strong partnership between the government, civil society, private sector, donors,

and other stakeholders, and even crosses borders (Lithuania and Ukraine). This project (2001–2003) focuses upon the role of all stakeholders in the development process, and how partnerships between NGOs and local government are being strengthened. The project will create a monitoring tool, “Agenda 21 Audit”, which will be used to conduct 240 audits in more than a hundred local agencies, in the sector of public service delivery. This model will be tested and then implemented in Lithuania and Ukraine, in subsequent phases.

Another such initiative was undertaken by PAUCI, in the Direct Citizen Participation as Local Democracy Guarantee project. This project focused on fostering community involvement in local policymaking and increasing local government transparency and openness. Using training sessions, study tours, and publications, the project built awareness among key officials of local governments, NGO leaders, and business officials in north-eastern Ukraine to help them articulate their own plans and programs in aiming to improve local government-community relations in their towns. The Polish trainers transferred their own newly acquired experience in facilitating this partnership-based, capacity building program.

### *Development results*

An excellent example of a project which achieved concrete development results, linked to the overall aims of the country’s vision, is found in USAID’s Local Government Partnership Program (LGPP), implemented in Poland in 1997–2001. The LGPP’s vision was to facilitate a local government that is effective, responsive, and accountable. The LGPP, therefore, increased

the capacity of gminas to deliver services and manage resources efficiently, improve indigenous mechanisms supporting local government and to increase participation of local communities in local government decision-making through increased inputs of citizens, NGOs, and business organisations.

This resulted in:

- Design of a “gmina management model” in 45 partner gminas, and dissemination and implementation of it in other gminas;
- Building and supporting Polish training centres, NGOs, etc, in undertaking further activities in this domain;
- Promoting strategic management rules influencing national policy on local government;
- Concentration on 8 areas: (1) strategic management; (2) financial management; (3) economic development; (4) infrastructure finance and development; (5) municipal services and delivery; (6) housing management and development; (7) land economy and management; (8) public relations and citizen participation.

The results of this work included, as examples, approved water sector strategies, business plans to restructure water services, and privatisation of the administration of health-care centres. Further, a series of manuals was written to enable and disseminate project training, covering such topics as: Integrated Gmina Management; Capital Investment Plans; Infrastructure and Money; Restructuring Municipal Services; From Communication to Cooperation; Local Housing Strategies, etc.

### *Poland’s achievement*

*Local government reform is widely viewed as one of the most successful parts of the political, social, and economic transformations in Poland since 1989. Local government reform may not have been the most talked-about type of political initiative, but it has occupied quite a high position in the political agendas of successive governments.*

*Source: Swianiewicz, op. cit., p. 173.*



# Conclusions

## *There are concrete and important differences between the Polish and Ukrainian systems of TA*

This research sought to discover whether there are variables which influence successful TA implementation and the achievement of development objectives that are more tangible than mentality and political will. The answer is yes; Poland's steady reform achievements in the sphere of local government are directly correlated to the very system of TA, which affects all aspects of donor activity, including project design. Further, the Polish strategic framework complies with the criteria of the World Bank's CDF, which is another touchstone of success. Unfortunately, the technical assistance environment in Ukraine lacks both a national strategy and attention to implementation of the CDF.

The difference between these two systems at work in Poland and Ukraine is obviously powerful and decisive regarding the quality and efficiency of the transformation process.

## *Polish TA projects concretely achieve the World Bank's CDF criteria*

As the research revealed, the technical assistance projects in Poland fully corresponded to the World Bank's criteria for effective TA delivery:

- long-term, holistic vision;
- country ownership;
- partnership;

- achieving concrete development results that are linked to the overall aims of the country's national vision.

In Ukraine, on the contrary, there were no projects where we could trace the above-mentioned principles. Although some projects achieved some of the criteria, no project achieved all of them.

## *It is crucial to have a framework for technical assistance*

In Poland, the APA is implemented by projects designed to achieve benchmarks created by the EU and Poland, in dialogue. Therefore, the EU accession framework directs and systematises all technical assistance in the country. For instance, under PHARE, TA is designed “*not to foster general cooperation but to deliver specific results agreed between the parties in advance for the implementation of priority areas of the *acquis*, as set out in the Accession Partnerships.*”<sup>14</sup> Further, “The integration process is not simply a question of approximating candidate countries' legislation to that of the Community; it is also one of ensuring the effective and efficient implementation of [the *acquis*]. It includes the development of relevant structures, human resources, and management skills. Institution building means designing management systems and training and equipping a wide range of civil servants, public officials, professionals and relevant private sector actors.”<sup>15</sup> Analysis of the data generated by this research project discloses this connection between donor objectives and PHARE project goals, activities, outputs, and outcomes. As a result, these criteria are being realised and Poland's democratic reforms in the sector of local government are stead-

<sup>14</sup> Phare, EU Enlargement: A Historic Opportunity, p. 20.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 20

ily increasing and deemed as highly successful.

Obviously, the PCA is not playing the same role in Ukraine's TA environment, nor is the EU's *Charter on Local Government*.

### *Local government*

In Ukraine, major problems in local government reform are impeding the establishment of democracy. Our analysis revealed how the capacity for newly democratic functions of local government was created and immediately implemented in Poland. Further, the EU carefully oversaw the creation and management of these new structures at all levels. Working in partnership, Poland and the EU developed a systematic process of local government reform that dovetailed into the total government package for Poland. These transformations thus worked in harmony; the newly defined structures and procedures for the central government enabled democratic reforms at the local level. In Ukraine, however, the two governments are pitted against each other because of the central government's continuing executive role in local government bodies that no longer fits the reforms made there. Instead of working like a smoothly functioning machine, the gears

are grinding and clashing, undercutting democratic transformation at all levels of government. Because the central government continues the old role of executive decision making at the local level, the real functions of the two governments remain unclear. This creates inefficiency, duplication, and chaos.

Although both countries have executed excellent initiatives in the area of local government reform, the fact that projects in Ukraine are partial, discrete, and not coordinated in a systemic way undercuts the influence and long-term effectiveness of the project results. As an example, when a Ukrainian city or group of cities participates in a project on public administration reform, the impact of any manuals generated is limited to the city or cities where the project is implemented, instead of maximising the dissemination potential of the work. Further, the lack of an over-arching framework reduces collaboration between donors, and between the Ukrainian government and donors, often leaving confusion, duplication, and wasted intellectual, material, and financial resources. These considerations give substance to the policy recommendations outlined below.

# Policy Recommendations

We divided our policy recommendations into those relevant to the Government of Ukraine and those for the donors. **We advise the Government to:**

- Develop the PCA as a technical system and strategic framework for reforms;
- Design and coordinate all local government projects under the framework of the PCA and the European Charter on Local Self-Government;
- Create a technical calendar plan for PCA implementation, with strictly defined benchmarks;
- Ensure that the goals, objectives, and activities of technical assistance support and target the PCA, in order to strategically direct TA activity;
- Facilitate public consultation, discussion, and policy analysis of the proposed Law of Ukraine “On international technical assistance”, to ensure its collaboration with the PCA;
- Provide public consultation, discussion and policy analysis of the proposed government resolution on the coordination of technical assistance in Ukraine, to ensure its collaboration with the PCA;
- Organise regular meetings with all ministries, to set out the priorities and spheres for technical assistance activities for local government reform, in the framework of realising the PCA and the European Charter on Local Self-Government;
- Organise regular meetings with all donors, in order to coordinate joint activity in Ukraine in the framework of realising the PCA and the European Charter on Local Self-Government;

- Establish a monitoring organisation to oversee the implementation of technical assistance in Ukraine, in the framework of realizing the PCA and the European Charter on Local Self Government; and
- Establish a system of coordinating donor information and results that is user-friendly and easily accessible.

**Our policy recommendations for the donor community in Ukraine are the following:**

- Projects need to target and facilitate the implementation of the PCA through setting priorities, principles, and standards of the European Charter on Local Self-Government;
- Project design needs to take consideration of CDF principles;
- Create a calendar plan for the implementation of the PCA and Charter criteria;
- Implement activities that concretely achieve the priorities of the PCA, and that are sustainable and repeatable;
- Create outputs such as manuals and documents, and provide training sessions that can be transferred across the country to extend the impact of a project’s results;
- Twinning with local self-government bodies in the EU member and candidate countries must be incorporated into project activities, in order to achieve European alignment and realise the criteria of the PCA;
- Include the government of Ukraine in the decision-making process for project tenders, in the framework of realising the

PCA and the European Charter on Local Self-Government;

- Donors' collaboration with each other and the government must include tracking sectoral and geographical coverage, to ensure that key priorities are imple-

mented comprehensively across Ukraine; and

- Establish a system of coordinating donor information and results that is user-friendly and easily accessible.

# Annex

*Table 4. Donor contacts (as of 20 December 2001)*

Donor	Number of contacts				Web-site	Hardcopy	Strategy	Results
	E-mail	Phone	Fax	Interview				
<b>Bilateral programs</b>								
CIDA	4	2	1	0	Only source of information	Not available	Available on web-site	No response to contacts; Projects lists and information available on web-site
DFID	4	4	0	0	Available but not downloadable	Project descriptions sent by e-mail	Strategy sent by regular mail	List of projects and the Country Strategy Paper supplied; Consultations with government representatives took place before the Strategy was formulated
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung	2	0	0	0	General description of fund activity was available	Not available	Not available	No response to contacts; Only general descriptions on web-site
IRF	4	9	0	1	Projects not available	Project list provided during interview	Not available	Supplied with annual reports; provided a project list (1995-1999); Strategy created in cooperation with Program Council Members and experts during the strategic planning process. In total, over 100 persons take part in this process
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung	2	2	0	0	Projects not available	Not available	Available on web-site	Description of activities sent by e-mail
MATRA	2	0	0	0	Projects not available	Not available	Sent via e-mail	Reply by e-mail with project lists and strategy
SIDA	2	3	1	0	Projects not available	Project descriptions sent via e-mail; SIDA statistics document sent by regular mail	Available on web-site	Project list supplied by e-mail

Donor	Number of contacts	Web-site	Hardcopy	Strategy	Results
Tacis	6 10 0 1	Projects not available on web-site, only the Strategy	1 project description provided by donor representative during interview; 2 interim reports sent by e-mail	Available on web-site	Project description and 2 interim reports were provided; Procedures for strategy development were explained during interview: every three years consultations with government officials take place and the Tacis strategy is usually created according to government needs; Evaluation documents for internal use only
USAID	6 12 4 0	Additional source of information	Not available	Available on web-site	After extensive e-mail and phone contacts, the promised information was sent by regular mail
<b>International programs</b>					
OSCE	2 0 0 0	Projects available	Not available	Not available	No response to our contacts; Web-site indicates there are no projects in this area
UNDP	2 3 0 0	Projects available but not updated regularly	Not available	Available on web-site	Projects in this sector for only 1999-2001; One project implemented but information not released
WB	4 2 0 0	Only source of information	Not available	Available on web-site	Projects on web-site

*Table 5. Geographical coverage of local government reform projects by City / Oblast / Voivodship (number of projects)*

**UKRAINE**

Donor	Cities	Oblasts	Oblast (city)	Natio- nal	Not spe- cified
CIDA	0	0	3 Ivano-Frankivsk (oblast centre), Kharkiv (Chuhuviv, Kupiansk), Ternopil (oblast centre), Kyiv (oblast centre) (2)	0	1
DFID	2 Kyiv	0	0	0	0
IRF	5 Lviv, Kharkiv, Kyiv (3)	5 Dnipropet- rovsk, Odesa (2), Poltava (2)	3 Ivano-Frankivsk (oblast centre), Crimea (Simferopol), Poltava (Komsomolsk)	0	0

Donor	Cities	Oblasts	Oblast (city)	Natio- nal	Not specified
FES	0	0	0	0	0
KAS	0	0	0	0	0
MATRA	3 Kyiv (2), Odesa	1 Zaporizhia	0	0	8
SIDA	1 Irpen	0	0	0	1
Tacis	0	0	0	0	0
USAID	6 Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Izium, Sumy, Poltava, Lubny, Luhansk, Lviv, Severodonetsk, Donetsk, Horlivka, Rivne, Chernivtsi, Kirovohrad, Mariupol, Kryvyi Rih, Zhytomyr	1 Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Luhansk, Donetsk	0	1	11
OSCE	0	0	0	0	0
UNDP	0	0	0	0	0
WB	0	0	1 Ivano-Frankivsk (oblast centre), Kharkiv (Chuhuiv, Kupiansk), Ternopil (oblast centre)	0	0
<b>Total</b>	17	7	7	1	21

#### POLAND

Donor	Cities (Gminas)	Powiats	Voivodships	Nationwide coverage	Not specified
British Know How Fund	11 gminas nationwide (9), all small towns (1), Ketrzyn (1)	1 powiats nation- wide	0	1 Poland	0
CIDA	3 Stargard Gdansk (2), Katowice (1)	0	0	0	6
FES	7 Warsaw, Gliwice, Gdansk, Hann- Munden, Darmstadt, Prudnik, Magdeburg	0	0	2 Gminas and powiats nationwide	0

Donor	Cities (Gminas)	Powiats	Voivodships	Nation-wide coverage	Not specified
UNDP Umbrella Program	0	0	0	2 Local governments nationwide (1), Towns and gminas nationwide (1)	1
USAID (incl. PAUCI)	3+4=7 45 gminas 6 cities Bielsko-Biala (1), Klodzko (1), Ketrzyn (1), Lubaczow (1)	0	1 Silezia	0	14+1=15
WB	0	1 Lomza, Myslenicki, Gryfinski	1 Six voivodships in the Odra River basin	2 Rural areas nationwide (1), Municipalities nationwide (1)	0
PHARE	2 Katowice, Bielsko-Biala, Opole, Bilgoraj, Dzialdowo, Kutno, Lubawka, Nidzica, Starachowice, Ustrzyki, Wicko, Zelow	0	8 Lodz (4), Walbrzych (3), Rzeszow (3), Suwalki (3), Olsztyn (3), Katowice (3), Piotrkow (3), Sieradz (2), Krosno (2), Nowy Sacz (2), f. Elblag (1), f. Koszalin (1), f. Lomza (1), f. Zamosc (1), Malopolskie (3), Podkarpackie (4), Swietokrzyskie (4), Pomorskie (1), Warminsko-Mazurskie (2), Lubuskie (1), Lublin (1), Slask (2), Kujawsko-Pomorskie (2), Zachodniopomorskie (1), Podlaskie (1), Nationwide Baltic Region (1)	4 Boarder regions (2), Gminas and Powiats nationwide (2)	2
<b>Total</b>	30	2	10	11	25



*Table 6. Local government project budgets (USD)*

**UKRAINE**

Donor	Small grants (1,000–5,000)	Medium grants (5,001–15,000)	Large grants (15,001–1 million) <sup>16</sup>	Over 1 million	Not specified
CIDA	0	0	1	3	0
DFID	0	0	0	1	1
FES	0	0	0	0	0
IRF	12	9	4	0	0
KAS	0	0	0	0	0
MATRA	0	0	0	0	9
SIDA	0	0	0	0	2
Tacis	0	0	0	0	0
USAID	0	0	1	2	16
OSCE	0	0	0	0	0
UNDP	0	0	0	0	0
WB	0	0	0	1	0
<b>Total</b>	12	9	6	7	28

**POLAND**

Donor	Small grants (1,000–5,000)	Medium grants (5,001–15,000)	Large grants (15,001–1 million)	Over 1 million	Not specified
British Know How Fund	0	0	0	14	0
CIDA	0	0	1	0	8
FES	0	0	0	0	9
PHARE	0	1	0	14	1
USAID (+PAUCI)	0	0	7	9	2+5
UNDP Umbrella Program	0	0	0	0	3
WB	0	0	0	4	0
<b>Total</b>	0	1	8	41	28

*Table 7. Criteria implementation: PCA / APA*

**UKRAINE (PCA)**

Donor	Mentioned	Not mentioned
CIDA		+
DFID		+
FES		+
IRF		+
KAS		+
MATRA		+
SIDA		+
Tacis		+
USAID		+
OSCE		+
UNDP		+
WB		+

**POLAND (APA)**

Donor	Mentioned	Not mentioned
British Know How Fund	14	0
CIDA	0	9
FES	2	7
PHARE	16	0
USAID (incl. PAUCI)	3	15+5=20
UNDP Umbrella Program	2	1
WB	2	2
<b>Total</b>	39	39

<sup>16</sup> Note: for Ukrainian projects, large grants do not exceed USD 200,000.

The journal **POLICY STUDIES** was established by the International Centre for Policy Studies in January 1999. **POLICY STUDIES** presents the results of policy research carried out by ICPS consultants, partners, and other think tanks in Ukraine and the intellectual community.

**POLICY STUDIES** is financed by the Open Society Institute.

This issue of **POLICY STUDIES** was prepared by:  
project leader – Dr. Vira Nanivska; project co-ordinator – Olha Shumylo;  
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Editor of **POLICY STUDIES**: Maksym Mashliakivsky  
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Copy editor: D. (Ksenia) Ovcharenko

Our special thanks for assistance and advice go to the staff and consultants of ICPS.

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Printed in Ukraine by Pekotoff-print

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